The institutional aspect of post-crisis banking regulation reform (Basel III) remains unsettled, and as such undermines regulators' efforts to shape a seamless platform for international financial intermediation. The lack of global acceptance of the Basel III standards amid the internationalization of banking activities is one of the main reasons for regulatory asymmetries which are difficult to handle at the national level. In this context, the efforts of governments and financial regulators are a central core of their policy in protecting banking sectors from systemic risks. It becomes imperative to bring together national mechanisms of banking regulation and to develop a regional system of regulatory institutions, as is evidenced by the single supervisory mechanism in the eurozone countries.
The New Institutional Framework for International Banking Regulation
The Aftermath of Banking Sector Deregulation
The largescale economic meltdown at the turn of the 2010s, which affected almost all global financial markets, signified a principally new phenomenon -the globalization of macro level instability. A variety of factors underlying the crisis gave birth to plenty of expert opinions and academic discussions, and there was little doubt that the crisis was an outcome of a sim plified approach to financial regulation 2 that had lasted almost 30 years, beginning in the late 1970s. Neglect of the fundamental principles of financial supervision and misunderstanding of the risks of deregulation rolled back the ability of banking regulators to effectively withstand crisis developments and economic downturns.
The failure of deregulation also exposed gaps and problems in the institutional structure of banking regulation. 3 Regardless of the regulatory framework, 4 the mechanisms and instruments of international and national regulators failed to meet the objectives of banking regulation and supervision 5 and did not resolve mounting challenges in the financial sector. The ongoing pro cess of diversification and sophistication of financial products and services, the lack of trans parency of the operating models of credit institutions, and breakthrough banking technologies clashed with the outdated and maladjusted mechanism of financial supervision. The domina tion of the shorttermism ideology 6 to the detriment of stress resilience policy eroded the bal ance between profitability and risk, which adversely affected financial stability. Obviously, the increasing regulatory inconsistencies amid moderated financial intermediation and increased interconnectedness of financial institutions did contribute to information asymmetry 7 in global financial markets, which logically resulted in the end of the deregulation era.
Incongruity between the institutional framework of regulation, on the one hand, and the needs of economic development and growth and the challenges of financial globalization, on the other, has been resolved by shifting the postcrisis regulatory priorities to the area of crisis management and financial stability. 8 At the same time, the development of an efficient regula tory mechanism is constrained by the variety of operating models of credit institutions and, accordingly, the extent of their ability to adapt themselves to the specifics of contemporary su pervision standards, while being determined by the objectives of macrofinancial management. The balanced mechanism of regulatory policy also depends on the extent of independence of regulatory institutions. It is clear that the imbalance between financial intermediation and regu lation will reduce the efficiency of banking activity and will remain a source of instability , thus undermining efforts on international coordination of regulatory reform 9 and impeding its internationalization.
Inconsistencies and Risks in the Contemporary International Banking Regulation Order
In the Russian and foreign academic literature, issues of international banking regulation are mainly addressed from economic perspectives, which at first glance may seem reasonable given the overwhelming scale of the reform and the macroeconomic uncertainty that challenges its implementation. However, in the context of banking evolution, issues of economic cycles and their synchronization with regulation 10 are necessary but not sufficient for ensuring the stress resilience of banks and banking systems. Given the higher degree of internationalization of financial intermediation and institutional interdependence in the global financial markets, bringing the banks back to their precrisis power as driving forces of the economy can hardly be considered in isolation from the issue of the coordination of international regulatory reform, including regulatory institutions. 11 Currently, the international level of banking regulation consists of a system of regulatory authorities (but not institutions) whose responsibilities are limited to the coordination of regu latory reform and the calibration of regulatory policy, as well as recommendations for the regu lators at the national level:
ۜ the Group of 20 (G20) as the "supreme authority" for the coordination of international regulatory reform and its main driving force; 8 The system of international regulation that evolved in the postcrisis period is a sweeping change in economic policy driven by common objectives aimed at more rigorous measures to minimize systemic risks and, accordingly, risks of crisis developments due to the stabilization effect when regulating the banking sector in order to restore the precrisis key performance indicators of banks, as well as ensuring their sustainability and the continuity of financial intermediation. 9 Known as Basel III, it is a set of standards and recommendations for banking supervision developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in 2010-11 aimed at reduction of risk exposure in the financial sector by the introduction of a more rigorous minimum capital adequacy ratio, liquidity, leverage, stable funding, longterm management of systemic risks and a higher level of transparency. Basel III should have been completed before 1 January 2019. 10 Based on the objective of financial stability, the effectiveness of regulatory reform depends on synchro nization of regulatory and supervisory cycles with economic and financial cycles. The implementation of this objective is linked to the use of a mixture of flexible standards of prudential banking supervision and macro prudential regulation tools (see, for example E. Dzhagityan [2017a] for more details on macro prudential poli cies). This approach not only facilitates the adaptation of banks to regulatory transformations but also reduces the dependence of the banking sector on adverse externalities. 11 Hereinafter, regulatory institutions include national/supranational institutions of banking regulation and authorized institutions at the international level, which are not regulatory institutions by status but are as signed to coordinate the reform with national/supranational institutions of banking regulation. ۜ the Financial Stability Board (FSB) as the coordinating body for the international reg ulatory reform process; and ۜ the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 12 as the methodological and technological hub of international regulatory reform and modernization of the regulatory mechanism (also known as Basel III). It is difficult to assess the efficiency of these international authorities, since the principles and standards of Basel III have been implemented only in a few countries, while regulatory in novations depend on whether the regulatory transformation is sought at the national level. The lack of an institutional platform for international banking regulation challenges the concept of financial stability and constrains regulatory changes, thus undermining the integrity of the re form. Inconsistency of institutional aspects of the new regulatory order amid diversity of regula tory instruments seriously affects the ability of banking regulators to mitigate systemic risks, not only in the national/regional financial markets but also globally. 13 The lack of international regulatory institutions leaves open the issue of the effectiveness of the international system of banking regulation. Among the consequences of a poor institu tional framework is the ambiguity of the institutional affiliation of banking regulation at the national level: unlike monetary policy, which is solely assigned to a central bank, 14 banking regulation can be assigned both to a central bank (the so called "monoinstitutional" regulatory framework) and to specialized institutions ("multiinstitutional" regulatory framework 15 ). The monoinstitutional framework implies extra costs associated with intra institutional conflicts of interest, while the multiinstitutional framework comes with extra costs associated with inter institutional regulatory coordination. There are also a number of other specifics related to the organizational design of banking regulation (see, for example, D.T. Llewellyn [2006, p. 4] ).
The absence of a single approach to the institutional affiliation of banking regulation and the dearth of international/supranational regulatory institutions inevitably weakens the syn ergetic effect of reform, diminishing its potential and fuelling reform asymmetries, including:
ۜ the increase of the gap between the national principles of effective banking supervision and those stipulated by Basel III [BIS, 2012a] , which blurs the perspectives on the align ment of regulatory standards at the national and international levels ; ۜ the risk of regulatory arbitrage as a result of differences in national regulatory regimes and oversight standards; 16 ۜ the regulatory capture phenomenon due to the interconnectedness of regulators, eco nomic actors and financial markets ; and 12 The BCBS is not a supranational authority, its decisions are not legally binding and it cannot impose penalties or any other sanctions [BIS, 2018] . 13 Thus, despite the efforts of international regulators to reduce the adverse effect of large banks for the banking sector and the economy at large, their aggregate assets grew by 40% over the period 2005-14. Further, the share of their assets to GDP has also increased [World Bank Group, 2018, p. 10] .
14 Hereinafter, for the convenience of the readers, the term "central bank" is also applicable to other institutions with central bank functions (national bank, reserve bank, monetary agency, monetary administra tion, etc.). 15 With a multiinstitutional regulatory structure, the central bank retains regulatory/supervisory func tions (fully or partially), or regulation of financial markets can be assigned to other specialized institutions. 16 Regulatory arbitrage is a product of the different regulatory regimes which, in turn, implies higher pro fits that are often associated with speculation in financial markets. At the same time, a loose regulatory regime is associated with higher operational risks, which can later become a source of instability in the banking sector and trigger the crossborder transmission of systemic risks. The regulatory arbitrage policy is mainly used by the systemically important financial institutions operating in the global financial markets. Another aspect of regulatory arbitrage is attributable to macro level risks: the higher the risk level, the more difficult it is for banks to raise extra capital from the market due to its rising cost and vice versa. ۜ the longstanding uncertainty of the concept of systemically important financial insti tutions (SIFIs) 17 (particularly in the European Union), which encourages prioritization of national interests to the detriment of the globalization of reform . The unsettled issues of postcrisis regulation amid the weaknesses of its institutional framework is one of the main reasons regulators have been unable to reduce the assets of SIFIs, including global systemically important banks (GSIBs), to a level that does not pose a threat to financial stability (Table 1) . Despite the decline of the share of their assets to the total assets of national banking sectors (except for Russian banks) and the numerous efforts of regulators to bring their operating models to traditional banking activity (by deemphasizing nonfinancial assets), that level remains high while their assets continue to grow (except for British banks). 18 It seems that the unresolved issue with the domination of the largest banks is one of the failures of reform, given that it was finalized by 1 January 2019. 19 According to experts, the higherthanexpected costs of regulatory compliance stem from the "underinstitutionalization" of the regulatory framework. The growing costs main ly affect the large banks that are leaders in attracting deposits and securities trading, which in turn require additional expenses for the redesign and adjustment of their operating models . However, cost savings depend on the flexibility of the approach of the national regulators to the standards and recommendations of Basel III when implementing the current regulatory standards , i.e. the standards applicable at the national level.
In this regard, it is clear that the efficiency of the postcrisis regulatory regime is deter mined by a combination of the principles of international reform and the interests of the nation al banking sectors. This is corroborated by findings on the regulatory system with the focus on the stress resilience of banks and the effectiveness of their role as the creditors of the economy . In other words, this regime is a kind of regulatory equilibrium, meaning that the ability of banks as creditors coincides with the needs of the economy for credit resourc es. However, for a number of reasons associated with more rigorous criteria for the stress resil ience of the banking sector and the power of regulators in the minimization of systemic risks, national regulators are not always able to extend an adequate level of regulatory effectiveness to ensure financial stability. That is why the issue of "deriskization" of the banking sector remains open. Moreover, the process of shaping the postcrisis regulatory order showed that none of the countries and none of the national regulators alone could develop effective measures to overcome the aftermath of the crisis , 20, 21 which refutes the scepticism of a number of experts regarding the failure of financial globalization 17 The issue of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), including global systemically impor tant banks (GSIBs) (they are also known as "too big to fail") relates to the higher costs for the financial system and the economy at large in case of their insolvency and in the unexpected outcomes associated with their dysfunction, and broadly, with financial disintermediation. 18 One should not underestimate the increase of banking costs in meeting the Basel III standards, which implies that a decrease of assets is associated with lower profitability which may be deficient in covering such costs. 19 Without the latest aspects of the regulatory reform in December 2017 which complement some of the conceptual provisions of Basel III and aim at lessbiased measurement of riskweighted assets and capital ad equacy standards [BIS, 2017] . 20 The extent of interconnectedness in global finance is impressive. Thus, about three quarters of the total losses of banks headquartered in the UK are in their overseas operations [Broadbent, 2012] ; total losses of branches/subsidiaries of foreign banks operating in Ireland exceeded €22 billion, or 18% of Ireland's GDP for the period [BIS, 2012b . 21 According to a World Bank study, about 46% of top executives of credit institutions consider that con temporary banking regulation is unable to adequately minimize the risks of financial instability [World Bank Group, 2018] . CAGR (Compound annual growth rate) is the annual average growth rate of consolidated assets of the ibank calculated on the basis of compound interest using the following formula:
indicates assets of the ibank as of the end of the period; Х i(0) indicates assets of the i-bank as of the beginning of the period; n is the number of years in the period reduced by one. and regionalization, especially in developing countries. The joint effort of governments remains perhaps the only factor in developing the most effective regulatory policy amid the uncertainty of a macro level and riskcontributing environment, while having a shortage of reliable tools for early risk identification. Furthermore, given the increased interconnectedness of financial in stitutions in global financial markets, the crisismanagement capacity of national governments has been significantly limited in recent years [Aikins, 2019; , 22 and if they did act, the results were often insignificant due to the flawed understanding of the complex pro cesses of international economic dynamics . Therefore, it appears that the efficacy of national regulators to withstand crisis developments depends on the banks that they super vise: along with banks' internationalization, regulators become less capable of providing not only effective oversight, but also early identification of systemic risks and systemwide stress. One should not delusively believe that the ideas of financial globalism determine regula tory policy at the national level, taking into account a number of drawbacks in the conceptual framework of the new regulatory standards (for example, when assessing capital adequacy) and vulnerabilities at the macro level (for example, being exposed to the volatility of global financial markets). Disproportions in the processes of financial globalization inevitably escalate infor mation asymmetry and macrofinancial imbalances, thereby increasing decisionmaking bi ases of national regulators. That is why the robustness of the regulatory and supervisory cycle is a timevarying factor of financial stability, and the effectiveness of regulation is measured by the lasting consistency and sustainability of financial intermediation. 23 The Regionalization and Supranationalization of Banking Regulation in the EAEU
The Background of Regulatory Regionalization
The contemporary processes of financial globalization generate the processes of economic regionalism , which in turn are determined by the specifics of econom ic systems and different dynamics of national economic development thus resulting in regionalization in the financial area. However, the specifics of the postcrisis model of international banking regulation do not fully comply with the objective of the "deriskization" of the banking sector and inhibit the efforts to ensure financial stability. This urges national regulators to jointly search for factors underlying sustainable development, including the development of regional banking regulation mechanisms. The rise of regionalism in banking regulation is also driven by the fact that Basel III standards will not be accepted and applied globally (at least for the time being), on the one hand, and by the need of further inter nationalization of banking systems, on the other, which national regulators alone cannot put into action due to the growing risks of asymmetries in international banking regulation.
The issues of regionalization of regulation have not yet received proper attention in the extant economic literature. Nevertheless, the research findings indicate a decrease in procycli cality in countries participating in integration processes if the convergence of national banking 22 However, the measures on stabilization taken by the governments of the crisisaffected Southeast Asian countries had a positive impact on key performance indicators of credit institutions (solvency, profitability, credit risk level) , although it can be assumed that it was systemically important banks with a higher level of internationalization that showed better performance, while their performance was also affected by the measures taken by governments of the countries in which they conducted their operations. 23 This denotes the settlement of disproportions of banking activity with lower costs (not exceeding the level at which they noticeably impact the profitability of banks and their performance) and for a time horizon free from any disproportions in banking activity. regulation mechanisms and the integration of national banking sectors is one of the driving forces of integration . 24 At the same time, the effectiveness of financial integration is higher for capitaldeficient countries which have access to new, relatively inexpensive sources of liquidity/funding 25 ; however, it is believed that such a redistribution of resources is associated with the risk of regulatory arbitrage stemming from different regulatory regimes and, therefore, escalation of systemic risks.
The European Union's Experience of Regionalized Banking Regulation
The regionalization of regulatory policy is a response to unresolved issues associated with the protection of national financial systems from adverse externalities. This process becomes more apparent during the postcrisis recovery and is best illustrated by the experience of the European Union (EU), where a system of supranational institutions of banking regulation was created following the crisis (Table 2) . Protection of the rights of policyholders and pension schemes participants; issues of corporate governance, audit and financial reporting of insurance and reinsurance companies and insurance intermediaries 24 According to the results of the same study, 50% of integration in banking regulation entails a decrease in synchronization of economic cycles by 0.2% [KalemliOzcan, Papaioannou, Peydró, 2010, p. 9] . At the same time, the issue of the quantitative assessment of integration proposed by the authors remains vague, taking into account the multiple factors affecting both the integration process along with its results and importance for financial stability. 25 Compared to the sources of funding/liquidity in the national financial market. From a functional perspective, the EU's regulatory institutions are based on three in terrelated platforms of integration -the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and single deposit insurance principles. The development of institutional infrastructure contributes not only to filling the void in the regulation of interna tional capital flow , but also to ensuring a balance of interests between different segments of the financial market , which is critical in the context of banking sector fragmentation.
The Institutional Structure of EAEU Banking Regulation: Specifics, Inconsistencies and Risks
The EAEU integration process requires more efficient trade and economic cooperation amid the lengthy recovery of the world economy following the crisis and the lack of handy reci pes for financial stability. Although Eurasian integration so far involves the nonfinancial sector only, the integration of the financial realm, including the mechanisms of banking regulation and prudential banking supervision, is critically important given the risks of inconsistency in integration and their lasting effects. 26 At the same time, use of the EU's experience in regulatory regionalization can reduce costs but does not guarantee the effectiveness of regionalization in the EAEU and its imple mentation. The problem is not only related to the significant imbalances of the macro level parameters and the lower potential of Eurasian financial institutions, nor only to the different approaches to macrofinancial management policy which can become a source of additional risk for integration processes [Shirov, Gusev, 2013, p. 15 ] thereby escalating inconsistencies of integration. The problem is also in the lack of a mutually agreed concept for a regional regu latory framework and understanding of the extent of the internationalization of the regional banking regulation mechanism. Finally, it remains unclear how the inconsistencies could be resolved should the concept and organizational format of the future EAEU supranational fi nancial markets authority, stipulated by the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union of 29 May 2014 [EAEU, 2014] not comply with the interests of national regulators.
The institutional basis of the EAEU regional regulatory mechanism will be an integral part of the EAEU regulatory system. In fact, the institutional basis has a critical meaning in the selfdevelopment of economic systems, thus minimizing the risks of bureaucracy and adminis tration [Grigor'ev, 2013, p. 51] . To date, there is only a broad outline of the future EAEU regu latory mechanism, the design of which, in accordance with the treaty on the EAEU, suggests the concentration of all regulatory functions in a single institution. It can be assumed that the choice of design of a supranational regulator is not accidental: it is a key to effective coordina tion among regulators of the EAEU states according to the matrix principle 27 (Table 3) . The single regulator of the financial market since its foundation in 1993. It appears that the principle of regulatory monocentrism in the EAEU, where regulatory responsibilities are borne by the central banks, is so far the optimal approach to the protection of regional financial markets from adverse externalities, at least until the processes of economic integration achieve organizational and managerial maturity. If the central banks of the EAEU states coordinate the development of the regional regulatory mechanism, this will support con sistency in regulatory decisionmaking and reduce the risks of fragmentation and information asymmetry in the EAEU financial markets.
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Despite the identical institutional structure of EAEU banking regulations, significant dif ferences in economic aspects of regulation may significantly slow down the delegation of au thority from the national to the supranational level 28 and, as such, may delay the operationaliza tion of the Eurasian financial markets authority. The problem in the differences of regulatory regimes could be resolved if the principles and standards of EAEUwide regulation are accept able to all EAEU states within the framework of the single regional regulatory mechanism -the socalled miniBasel III. 29 The miniBasel III framework implies the future EAEU regional banking regulation mechanism, including its supranational institutional architecture and standards of prudential banking supervision based on the core principles of effective banking supervision and Basel III, mutually agreed by the EAEU states. In other words, the miniBasel III concept suggests synchronization of national banking regulation regimes in the context of the objectives of EAEU integration and the development of a single EAEU financial market.
In terms of the coordination of regulatory convergence, the future supranational regulator to a certain extent simplifies the roadmap toward regulatory supranationalization. But will this secure the stress resilience of banks and banking systems to the extent of their ability to deci sively sustain integration processes as creditors of the economy? This question logically leads to a number of other questions, the answers to which should clarify the extent to which the convergence of national regulatory mechanisms and regulatory supranationalization would be a necessary and sufficient condition for launching a fullfledged banking regulation mechanism in the EAEU: ۜ Will the trilemma between capabilities, demand and the potential of regulatory supra nationalization in the EAEU be resolved? ۜ Will the singleinstitutional structure of supranational regulation be able to ensure the stress resilience of the EAEU national banking sectors and financial stability? ۜ Will the singleinstitutional structure of supranational regulation be able to ensure the effectiveness of measures for the early identification of systemic risks? ۜ What should be the extent, criteria and timeframe for delegation of authority from the national to a supranational level so that miniBasel III becomes the foundational frame work for the convergence of national regulatory regimes? ۜ Will supranational regulatory policy ensure equal access of banks to the financial mar kets of the EAEU states and, if so, will there be an EAEUwide level playing field given the incompatibility of the national financial sectors? ۜ How effectively will the possible inconsistencies of the national banking regulation mechanisms be resolved, including during the process of supranationalization? ۜ Will the supranationalization of regulation ensure that banks will not be affected by crises and, if so, will synergistic effects of the regional regulatory mechanism exceed the costs of ensuring the stress resilience of banks? ۜ Will the costs associated with the supranational regulatory mechanism be commensu rate with the synergistic effect of regionalization?
ۜ Will the matrix principle of interrelationship enhance the effectiveness of coordination between the national and supranational levels of regulation? ۜ Will the matrix principle of interrelationship enhance the adaptation capabilities of banks as a part of the transition to the principles and standards of miniBasel III? ۜ Will regulatory supranationalization diminish interaction between banks and national regulators?
The issues related to the institutionalization of banking regulation in the EAEU are linked to the issue of whether the future supranational regulator will be a fully functional authority: will it be effective as an institution, taking into account a singleinstitutionbased concentration of the economic aspects of regulation (for example, compared to regulatory responsibilities of the EU's regulatory institutions (see Table 2 )) and the coordination of the regulatory convergence process? Although supranationalization seems to be relatively simple, one should consider the hidden, currently unknown, risks of convergence which ultimately may outweigh the advan tages of a singleinstitutional regulatory structure with excessive centralization of supervisory power. The alternative scenarios for the EAEU regulatory mechanism can be called upon to address the needs of better regulatory logistics, the patterns of coordination between national regulators and convergence of national supervision regimes, the transparency of the regulatory mechanism, and the independence of regulatory authorities. Table 4 lays out the scenarios of regulatory convergence in the context of benefits and risks.
A matrixbased approach to the convergence of national regulatory mechanisms and singleinstitutionbased regulatory supranationalization (Scenario 1) suggests instant organi zational, economic and methodological interaction between national and supranational levels and, as such, can effectively manage systemic risks compared to Scenarios 2 and 3. However, due to the "underinternationalization" of the national banking sectors (except Russia), institu tional asymmetry and fragmentation of national financial sectors, as well as their focus mainly on the domestic financial markets, national regulators may be reluctant to delegate their power to the supranational level , driven by their expectations of dispropor tions and setbacks in regional economic cooperation. The situation is complicated by the weak representation of EAEU states' credit institutions in each other's banking sectors which primar ily devalues their potential as drivers of integration and creates risks of an ambivalent regulatory convergence. 30 Additionally, excessive centralization of responsibilities within a single regulator can seriously weaken efforts to overcome the asymmetries associated with differences in size, structure, competitiveness, systemic stress and stress resilience of the national banking sectors. It is expected that the criteria and the extent of delegation of regulatory power will be the issue of major concern during the process of mutual approval, and this may impede the convergence of national regulatory mechanisms in the miniBasel III framework, ultimately causing slack and maladjustment in the EAEU integration processes. This dilemma could find its solution in an EAEUlevel authority on regional financial stability, which would ensure a balanced ap proach to national regulators and the process of supranationalization; however, such an au thority is beyond the framework of the treaty on the EAEU and therefore does not fit into the institutional structure stipulated by Scenario 1.
The dominance of commercial banks in the EAEU banking sectors (compared with other categories of financial institutions, for example, credit cooperatives) to a certain extent clears the perspectives of intergovernmental consensus on banking supervision standards [Corbet, 30 Although the activities of credit institutions in the financial markets of other countries yield mutual benefits, and given the inevitability of this process in financial and economic integration, the redistribution of market share between local and foreignfunded banks in terms of loans may provoke fragmentation and volatility in financial markets; however, these risks increase in countries with open economies of smaller sizes . The synergistic effect of the twodomainbased organizational design of the regulator is ensured by the availability of a wider information base, which makes it possible to improve the accuracy of economic forecasts, including those for financial stability and sustainable economic growth.
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The result of hypothetically incorrect managerial decisionmaking based on extrapolation of the supervisory standards applicable to a certain segment of the financial market to another segment.
Notes. a
In accordance with the treaty on the EAEU, institution of a supranational authority for financial market regulation is scheduled for 2025. It is assumed that the supranational authority will be responsible for regulation of all segments of the financial market, similar to national regulators of the EAEU states that share the same responsibilities. Additionally, it will be tasked with oversight of issues related to systemic risks. b This is a hypothetical scenario based on a system of supranational regulatory institutions consisting of a Eurasian central bank, which to a certain extent will be responsible for the oversight of the EAEU banking sector, other segments of the financial market, financial markets infrastructure and macroprudential regulation. It will be also tasked with systemic risk oversight (similar to the postcrisis regulatory architecture in the EU (see Table 2) ). c This is a hypothetical scenario based on a singlelevel (the national level) structure of EAEU financial regulation, which should be complemented with an authority coordinating regulatory policies at the supranational level (for example, a standing advisory or supervisory council/committee).
Source:
developed by the author [Dzhagityan, 2015] . , which is a positive factor in all three scenarios of regulatory regionalization. At the same time, this sort of a simple microlevel landscape will require a simplified, leastcost approach to regionalization (Scenarios 1 and 3). However, possible sophistication of financial markets and diversification of financial instruments may require the inclusion in Scenarios 1 and 2 of a supranational regulatory authority that would be responsible for coordination of the regulatory convergence process, and the choice between these two scenarios will depend on the level of risks in the financial area and how it is protected from threats to financial stability. Scenario 2, associated with regulatory decentralization, could become the basis of a re gional regulatory mechanism in case of insurmountable differences in the organizational and functional structure of the national banking sectors and the infrastructure of the national finan cial markets. The multiinstitutional regulatory mechanism implies a higher level of efficiency in minimization of systemic risks and achievement of financial stability, drawing on the EU experience (see Table 2 ). On the other hand, the efficiency of this scenario will depend on the efficiency of coordination among supranational regulatory institutions and between them and the central banks of the EAEU states, as well as whether miniBasel III will be the core in sup porting the economic aspects of this scenario. The similarity with the institutional structure of EU banking regulation can open up new opportunities for the exchange of information, which in turn will contribute to the outcome of an EAEUwide regulatory mechanism, foster the growth of confidence in the EAEU supranational regulatory system and benefit international regulatory reform with expanded internationalization.
Unlike Scenarios 1 and 2, Scenario 3 does not involve supranational regulatory institu tions. Amid regulatory "simplification," the soundness of regionalization will be determined by consensus among the EAEU states on issues that are less concerned with regulatory policy and more concerned with the convergence of supervisory standards which can secure a level playing field and enhance the role of financial intermediation in integration processes. However, this approach does not address a number of issues that may affect not only the effectiveness of the regulatory regionalization process, but also the consistency of the future design of EAEU bank ing regulation, including issues of information exchange among national regulators for timely and coordinated decisionmaking (Scenario 1); the issues of identification of systemic risks (Scenario 2); the perspectives of internationalization of the regulatory mechanism (Scenarios 1 and 2); and the degree of independence of national regulators. 31 Also, the absence of suprana tional regulatory mechanisms will entail additional risks in the integration process [Zuev, 2011, p. 37] . Obviously, in the absence of a supranational coordinating authority, Scenario 3 may lack the principles of miniBasel III, thus creating the risk of nonachievement of regulatory consensus among the EAEU states.
Some Conclusions
Without questioning the institutional basis of EAEU financial market regulation stipulated by the treaty on the EAEU, it should be noted that the process of regionalization of banking regu lation most probably will be associated with unmanageable (systematic) risks in the Eurasian financial markets. Given the higher level of fragmentation of EAEU financial markets and the significant differences in national banking regulation regimes, these risks may further escalate systemic risks thus challenging the objective of financial stability.
In volatile macro level dynamics, the institutional landscape of EAEU banking regulation should become one of the fundamental determinants of Eurasian economic integration. How ever, significant differences in macroeconomic and macrofinancial management in the EAEU states, including regulatory regimes, are a source of inconsistencies of regulatory convergence, which to a certain extent diminishes the perspectives of regulatory regionalization. The experi ence of the system of regulatory institutions in the EU urges consideration of alternative ways to shape the institutional framework of EAEU banking regulation with the mutually agreed principles of institutional structure necessary to meet the regional regulatory priorities.
The choice of the best integration scenario for institutional supranationalization of bank ing regulation is limited by the unique model of EAEU integration and the underlying regula tory paradigm due to a number of differences in scope, structure, key parameters and dynamics of the macro level of the countries involved in integration, on the one hand, and the lack of a holistic concept of the regional regulatory mechanism and the future Eurasian banking union, on the other. However, the limited selection of criteria can be overcome by considering the in stitutional regionalization of regulation based on consolidated criteria and schemes that are the foundation of any integration process.
The choice of integration scenario should be determined by strategic benchmarks of inte gration that in turn should be driven by the extent of financial intermediation associated with the needs of integration processes, while the rationale of the choice should be predicated upon the development of an integrated ecosystem of regional banking regulation, the capability of which should not depend on a possible transformation of the EAEU realm.
The choice of integration scenario should depend on the ability of national regulators to find mutually agreed economic aspects of regulatory convergence, including the miniBasel III concept and implementation of its standards. The synergistic effect of Eurasian regulatory institutionalization will largely depend on the ability of miniBasel III to resolve the current regulatory trilemma -the convergence of national regulatory mechanisms, retention of the interests of national regulators and ensuring financial stability.
The choice of integration scenario should be based on common principles for the effective management of the volatile economic environment, a flexible and crisisprotective regulatory model and a consistent methodological framework that will solidify systemic stability in the EAEU financial area aimed at achieving the ultimate objective of regionalization -an EAEU banking union. It is likely that involvement of banks in the integration process will be ensured by flexible standards of prudential banking supervision within the miniBasel III framework, which will comply with the interests of national regulators and the objectives of regulatory re gionalization. In this context, possible calibrations of regulatory policy during the regionaliza tion process will set to elevate the role of banks to a principally new level, ensuring the effective ness of EAEU integration together with sustainable economic growth and financial stability.
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Джагитян Эдуард Павлович -к.э.н., доцент Департамента мировой экономики факультета мировой эко номики и мировой политики Национального исследовательского университета «Высшая школа экономи ки»; Российская Федерация, 101000, Москва, ул. Мясницкая, д. 20; Email: edzhagityan@hse.ru Посткризисные преобразования в сфере международного банковского регулирования, известные как Базель III, оставляют нерешенным ряд институциональных аспектов реформы, что ставит под сомнение эффективность функции международного финансового посредничества для обеспечения устойчивого экономического роста. С другой стороны, отсутствие перспектив внедрения стандартов Базеля III в глобальном масштабе на фоне интернационализации банковской деятельности является одной из главных причин регулятивных асимметрий, которые трудно разрешить на национальном уровне. В этих условиях сближение национальных механизмов банковского регулирования и формирование региональной регулятивной конструкции -одна из центральных задач правительств и регуляторов по защите банковских секторов от системных рисков, о чем свидетельствует единый надзорный механизм в странах еврозоны.
Укрепление стрессоустойчивости банковских секторов ЕАЭС и активное вовлечение банков в орбиту задач евразийской экономической интеграции потребуют формирования региональной системы банковского регулирования и надзора. Вместе с тем, поскольку разнорежимность национальных регу лятивных механизмов может препятствовать формированию механизма евразийского регулирования банковской сферы в отсутствие наднациональных институтов регулирования, запуск регулятивного ме ханизма в ЕАЭС зависит от того, будет ли формат «мини-Базель III», согласованный государствами -членами ЕАЭС в качестве методологического ядра регионализации и наднационализации, способствовать разрешению регулятивной трилеммы между возможностями, востребованностью и потенциалом наднационализации.
Институциональный аспект «мини-Базеля III» объективно сопряжен с вопросом полноформатности будущего наднационального органа по регулированию финансового рынка ЕАЭС, однако издержки сближения могут превысить преимущества моноинституциональной архитектуры регулирования вследствие реальных и неявных рисков разнорежимности национальных моделей регулирования. В этой связи мы рассматриваем альтернативные сценарии формирования механизма банковского регулирования в ЕАЭС, которые могут быть востребованы с точки зрения оптимизации логистики регулирования и алгоритмов сближения его национальных механизмов. На основе систематизации преимуществ и рисков каждого из сценариев и сравнительного анализа их состоятельности по обеспечению континуума функции финансового посредничества и достижения финансовой стабильности в ЕАЭС мы пришли к выводу об отсутствии в настоящее время каких-либо приоритетных путей формирования надна циональной регулятивной архитектуры в ЕАЭС. Вместе с тем интеграционным ориентиром сближения и ориентиром наднационализации могло бы стать сходство структуры национальных банковских секторов и выбор наименее затратного сценария, но при условии дополнения предполагаемого наднационального органа по регулированию финансового рынка ЕАЭС органом по координации процесса регулятивного сближения. 
